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ABSTRACT

American Intervention in the “New World Order”
By
Julie Benson

Advisor: Susan Woodward

The decision to intervene in another state's affairs is one of the most controversial foreign
policy decisions an American president can make during his or her administration. From calls for
isolationism during World War II to protests against the 2003 invasion of Iraq, intervention
policies are often contentious and debated both inside and outside the White House. What explains
this decision? How do leaders decide to intervene, or not intervene? I argue that, following the end
of the Cold War, the decision to intervene militarily was no longer constrained by anti-Soviet or
anticommunist doctrine, but instead heavily influenced by the policy preferences of elite advisors
within the executive branch. Using conflicts from the first four post-Cold War presidencies, I
demonstrate the influence of key officials and advisors in the decision to intervene in the Persian
Gulf War, Bosnia, Iraq in 2003, and Libya in 2011. I then examine three cases of non-interference
in U.S. policy—not enacting regime change in Iraq after Operation Desert Storm, initial reluctance
to intercede in the Bosnian civil war, and the refusal to intervene after the use of chemical weapons
in Syria—to further showcase the role of executive elites in the decision not to intervene.
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Introduction
As ordinary citizens wielded sledgehammers and pickaxes to tear down the graffiti-covered
Berlin Wall, the crumbling of concrete and rebar represented more than just the destruction of a
border separating two halves of one city. It portended a similar collapse of the power that
commissioned its construction and symbolized a fundamental shift in the composition of the
international system. The world was no longer dominated by two nuclear superpowers; the United
States stood alone in preeminence. Two years after the sledgehammers were shelved, then
President George H.W. Bush stood before a joint session of Congress and declared a “new world
order” in which the United Nations was “poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders” and
where “freedom and respect for human rights” could “find a home among all nations.” 1
In his book with his national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, former President George
H.W. Bush describes his “new world order” concept, believing that after the end of the Cold War,
the U.S. became “obligated to lead the world community to an unprecedented degree” and that
America “should attempt to pursue our national interests, wherever possible, within a framework
of concert without friends and the international community.” 2 With the United States as the sole
superpower following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it was in a unique position to pursue its
policy objectives and influence the future of the international system. Calls for multilateralism and
respect for human rights, even if only nominally, were echoed in the first four presidencies of this
new world order.

1

“Transcript of President Bush’s Address on End of the Gulf War,” New York Times, March 7, 1991,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1991/03/07/350791.html?pageNumber=8.
2 George H.W. Bush and Brent A. Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing
Group, 1998), 718, Kindle.
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Instead of intervention strategy being dominated by anti-Soviet and anticommunist
doctrine, as it was during the postwar period,3 the fall of the Soviet Union and end of the protracted
conflict left policymakers with a wide array of policy avenues to pursue. I argue that in the absence
of an identity-defining enemy, like the role the U.S.S.R. played after the Second World War, key
government officials were free to pursue their own policy preferences, which had an enormous
impact on American intervention behavior. Key administration officials, from national security
advisors to secretaries of state to UN ambassadors, were instrumental in the president’s decision
to involve the U.S. military in conflicts abroad.
My investigation into American intervention is broken down into the following sections.
First, I look to John MacMillan and Christian Reus-Smit for their conceptions of the practice of
international intervention. I next conduct an exploration into the vast literature surrounding a
leader’s decision to intervene before briefly discussing the use of archival methods in my study.
In the subsequent section, I describe the role elites in the four post-Cold War presidencies have
played in the decision to intervene militarily in Kuwait, Bosnia, Iraq, and Libya. I then contrast
the positive cases of U.S. involvement with three examples of non-intervention, examining the
refusal to enact regime change in Iraq after the Gulf War, early reluctance to intercede in the
Bosnian conflict, and the failure to follow through on President Barack Obama’s “red line” in
Syria. I finally conclude with alternative explanations for U.S. intervention and avenues for further
research.
What is intervention?
International intervention is a notoriously difficult concept to define. Different state and
nonstate actions can be brought under the term’s umbrella, from electoral interference to IMF

3

Mi Yung Yoon, “Explaining U.S. Intervention in Third World Internal Wars, 1945-1989,” The Journal of
Conflict Resolution 41, no.4 (Aug 1997): 582.
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structural adjustment programs. For the purposes of this research, John MacMillan’s definition of
international intervention is a useful baseline. He imagines intervention as “‘discrete acts’ of
‘coercive interference’ in the ‘domestic affairs’ of other states, and which do not change the formal
juridical status of the intervened party.”4 This means that acts resulting in colonies, or the
annexation of territory would not be classified as interventions. He further describes the act of
intervention as a mode “of coercion relatively well-suited to the regulation or mediation of conflict
between territorially bounded political communities and transnational social forces.” 5
MacMillan also distinguishes between intervention and non-intervention as explored in the
academic literature, which is helpful for this investigation. He writes, “that the study of
intervention has long been in the shadow of non-intervention has served to mask a fundamental
difference between the two, which is that whilst non-intervention has been the norm within the
core of the modern international system, intervention has long been permissive in relations
between core and periphery.”6 The decision to intervene, of course, is left to the discretion of the
powerful. Great powers can coercively interfere in the affairs of less powerful states, while they
remain isolated from the same danger from their peers.
Christian Reus-Smit calls into question the “sovereignty frame” that most international
relations scholars use when discussing intervention. He presents another conception of
international intervention, defining it as “the transgression of a unit’s realm of jurisdiction,
conducted by other units in an order, acting singly or collectively.” 7 Furthermore, he describes

4

John MacMillan, “Intervention and the ordering of the modern world,” Review of International Studies 39 (2013):
1041.
5 MacMillan, “Intervention,” 1039.
6 MacMillan, “Intervention,” 1054.
7 Christian Reus-Smit, “The concept of intervention,” Review of International Studies 39 (2013): 1058.
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interventions as breaches designed to reconstruct the previous identities, institutions, and behaviors
of the target of interference.8
Both MacMillan and Reus-Smit provide definitions of international intervention that
elucidate the concept, while also being thorough enough to encapsulate its complexity. The
combination of both contribute to a solid basis for a working definition useful here: international
intervention is the “coercive interference” of a state or coalition of states in the internal affairs of
another.
Why do states intervene?
While defining the behavior of intervention is a notably difficult task, perhaps more
challenging is understanding why states do it in the first place. Scholars have long investigated
why states intervene in the affairs of others, even if a rational analysis suggests otherwise. As
Reus-Smit (2013) writes, interventions must always be justified because they violate a unit’s
jurisdiction, which is one of the foundational principles of international society. 9 In the following
section, I explore the current literature on the justification of international intervention.
Paul Huth (1998) explores why major powers intervene to defend smaller states in the
international arena. He looks at major power intervention between 1918 and 1988 to also
understand when strategies of “extended deterrence” are utilized by these major powers. 10
Employing a rational-choice framework, Huth avers that the leaders of major powers weigh both
domestic political factors and national security interests when deciding intervention strategy. 11 The
delicate balance between these two arenas leads to possible trade-offs between government

8

Reus-Smit, “The concept,” 1058.
Reus-Smit, “The concept,” 1058.
10
Paul K. Huth, “Major Power Intervention in International Crises, 1918-1988,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution
42, no.6 (December 1998): 745.
11 Ibid, 746.
9
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resources.12 Leaders may also choose to intervene to shore up domestic political support and
enhance their power positions,13 or refuse to intervene in foreign affairs if the resource constraints
become unbearable.14 Huth’s work is of particular interest for this study, as he focuses on the role
that leaders play in intervention policy. While Huth modifies typical realist theory to explain the
motives of these leaders, I argue that power calculations are not at the core of the decision-making
process.
Mi Yung Yoon (1997) adds to intervention theory with her argument concerning U.S.
intervention policy after the Second World War. She examines a combination of three variables—
strategic, economic, and domestic—that influenced American intervention from 1945 to 1989. 15
She argues that U.S. strategic interests, including anticommunist and containment doctrine,
influenced when and where intervention occurred.16 Economic factors explain intervention policy
through a Marxist analysis, as Yoon maintains the U.S. interfered in “third world” affairs to secure
material resources and entry into new markets.17 The third prong of Yoon’s argument—American
domestic context—explains its intervention behavior through public opinion, economic, and
electoral constraints.18 Using data from Eckhardt (1989) of Third World internal conflicts, she
ultimately finds that national security factors best accounted for U.S. foreign interference, and that
the economy and the presidential election cycle also acted as restrictions on intervention actions. 19
Yoon’s research is incredibly valuable for its wide scope, analyzing a multitude of factors from

12

Ibid, 747.
Ibid, 746.
14 Ibid, 747.
15 Yoon, “Explaining U.S. Intervention,” 581.
16 Ibid, 582.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid, 583-84.
19 Ibid, 597.
13
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national security to domestic economic performance. However, I am interested in the period
following the end of the Cold War, and on the influence of domestic policymaking elites.
Alastair Smith (1996) studies the likelihood of third-party interventions in interstate
conflicts. Focusing particularly on the impact of alliance reliability in the decision to intervene,
Smith argues that states with dependable allies are more likely to pursue policies leading to
conflict.20 To demonstrate his argument, Smith designs a theoretical model of a three-nation
system: an aggressor state, a target state, and a third-party state. 21 Using data from Singer and
Small (1996) and Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), his model evaluates how a target state
will react to an armed conflict based on the reliability of its allies. 22 Smith finds that alliances have
a significant impact on the probability that a third-party state will intervene in a war.23 In particular,
he observes that target states are more likely to retaliate after being attacked if they believe their
alliances to be reliable. 24 Furthermore, aggressor states are less likely to initiate conflicts if their
target has dependable alliances.25 Smith provides a fascinating addition to the intervention
literature; however, my research is not necessarily restricted to intervention in interstate wars, as I
am more interested in the specific intervention strategy of a single state.
In his 1998 contribution, Benjamin Miller investigates the logic underpinning U.S.
intervention after the end of the Cold War. Contradicting mainstream arguments that claim there
is no coherent rationale behind American intervention behavior after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, Miller claims that the U.S. has followed a cost-benefit analysis predicated upon evaluations

20

Alastair Smith, “To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A Biased Decision,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 40,
no.1 (Mar 1996): 17.
21 Ibid, 18.
22 Ibid, 21.
23 Ibid, 33.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
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of its regional interests.26 He classifies intervention behavior as massive, medium, limited, or as
non-interventions and illustrates each type with an example from American foreign policy.27 Miller
goes on to describe the causal relationship between the risk analysis and the intervention strategy
ultimately pursued. He describes six different combinations of incentives and constraints that
determine American intervention behavior: (1) high costs and high key interests suggest massive
interventions; (2) low costs but high key interests lead to medium-scale policies; (3) low costs and
high extrinsic interests also indicate medium-scale intervention; (4) high costs paired with high
extrinsic interests lead to non-intervention; (5) low costs together with low interests can result in
either limited policies or non-interference; and, finally, (6) high costs but low interests also result
in non-intervention.28 Miller’s investigation is very useful in my own study of American
intervention; however, while Miller focuses on the importance of a cost-benefit analysis, my
argument is based on the policy preferences of elite government officials.
Examining intervention at the micro-level, Elizabeth Saunders (2009) considers how
individual leaders affect intervention policies. She argues that leaders’ beliefs about where threats
originate determine the intervention policies they pursue. 29 Based on these perceptions, leaders
will choose either transformative or non-transformative intervention strategies.30 Transformative
interventions, including nation-building policies, target the domestic structure and institutions of
the enemy state.31 Alternatively, non-transformative interventions are much more limited in scope,

26

Benjamin Miller, “The Logic of US Military Interventions in the post-Cold War Era,” Contemporary Security
Policy 19, no.3 (December 1998): 73-74.
27 Ibid, 75-77.
28 Ibid, 83-86.
29 Elizabeth N. Saunders, “Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy,” International
Security 34, no.2 (Fall 2009): 121.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
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aiming at the resolution of a specific conflict. 32 According to Saunders, “internally focused”
leaders, who believe threats originate from the internal composition of enemy states, are inclined
to follow transformative policy prescriptions.33 “Externally focused” leaders, on the other hand,
perceive a direct causal relationship between threats and the security policies of enemy states. 34
She uses the examples of U.S. Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson to demonstrate
her argument, detailing how their differing causal beliefs affected their respective intervention
strategies toward Vietnam.35 Saunders’s article is perhaps the most influential in my argument,
inspiring the elite-level focus. While she emphasized the effect of causal beliefs on intervention
policy, I wish to explain how elites’ policy preferences affect the overall decision to intervene.
Walter Morales explores the rationales behind American interventions both during and
after the Cold War. He argues that U.S. intervention behavior changed during this period, a change
which can be explained by both public opinion and the makeup of the international system. 36
During the Cold War, he argues, U.S. intervention policies were built upon a foundation based on
anticommunist doctrine.37 Due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of a bipolar world,
U.S. officials needed a new basis for military interventions in foreign states. 38 Policymakers in the
post-Cold War era seek to justify intervention through international legal principles and
democratization rhetoric.39 He claims that with the end of the Cold War, the U.S. lost the
unquestionable rationale it used to justify foreign interference after the Second World War: fervent

32

Ibid.
Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid, 135.
36 Waltraud Queiser Morales, “US intervention and the New World Order: lessons from Cold War and post-Cold
War cases,” Third World Quarterly 15, no. 1(1994): 78.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid, 83-84.
33
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anticommunism.40 Furthermore, Morales argues that the post-Cold War justifications, such as
democratization and human rights rhetoric, are unable to recreate the one-of-a-kind ability of
containment doctrine to independently support U.S. foreign policy. 41 While Morales focuses on
the shift in American intervention rationales during and after the Cold War, my argument
decidedly involves the decision to intervene or not intervene following the end of the conflict.
Michael J. Boyle and Anthony F. Lang, Jr. (2021) investigate how American intervention
policies spread its political and economic culture across the world. 42 They argue that America’s
“strategic culture”—based on universalism, progressivism, pragmatism, and constitutionalism—
can explain its intervention practices.43 According to Boyle and Lang, Jr., American intervention
follows two patterns: limited and vindicationist interventions.44 Limited interventions are the
default U.S. policy, while vindicationist are more rare and much more intrusive on the domestic
institutions of the target state. 45 They further claim that variation in intervention practices can be
explained by “strategic surprises,” such as the Pearl Harbor ambush and 9/11 terrorist attacks. 46
The authors employ two Cold War-era case studies of American intervention in Lebanon and the
Dominican Republic to demonstrate the variation in policy. 47 While Boyle and Lang, Jr., present
an interesting argument about U.S. intervention practices, they focus on Cold War studies, whereas
my area of interest is after the end of the Cold War.

40

Ibid, 95.
Ibid.
42 Michael J. Boyle and Anthony F. Lang, Jr., “Remaking the World in America’s Image: Surprise, Strategic
Culture, and the American Ways of Intervention,” Foreign Policy Analysis (2021): 1.
43 Ibid, 4.
44 Ibid, 2.
45 Ibid, 1-2.
46 Ibid, 6.
47 Ibid, 11.
41
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Seung-Whan Choi and Patrick James (2016) explore three reasons behind American
intervention abroad: terrorism, human rights violations, and democracy promotion. 48 They provide
three hypotheses where U.S. military intervention is more likely: (1) high levels of terrorism; (2)
more human rights abuses; and (3) low levels of democracy.49 They also include some confounding
variables that may complicate the statistical model, including alliances with the United States and
economic development.50 They rely upon time-series data of 164 states from 1981 to 2005 to
underpin their argument. Choi and James find that the most consistent factor determining U.S.
military intervention abroad is tied to the liberal hypothesis: the U.S. is more likely to intervene in
states with high levels of human rights violations.51 The authors provide a compelling argument
about the role of human rights abuses in American intervention policy; however, their time frame
is limited, and the statistical model is unable to account for “real” motivations behind the decision
to intervene because of national security classification issues.52
While the intervention literature is rich in intriguing and compelling arguments, my
exploration into American intervention in the post-Cold War era fills a gap previously
understudied. The most common explanation for U.S. military intervention after the Second World
War is a combination of anti-Soviet and anticommunist doctrine, whereas intervention in the 1990s
and two-thousands tends to be less consistently dogmatic. When scholars do focus on post-Cold
War intervention, they focus more holistically on American national interests. 53 When researchers

48

Seung-Whan Choi and Patrick James, “Why Does the United States Intervene Abroad? Democracy, Human
Rights Violations, and Terrorism,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 60, no.5 (August 2016): 899.
49 Ibid, 905.
50 Ibid, 907.
51 Ibid, 913.
52 Ibid, 915.
53 Miller, “The Logic,” 73-74.
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do take a micro-level approach, like Saunders (2009), the case studies occur in the postwar period
and focus on causal beliefs, not policy preferences.54
My argument approaches U.S. intervention policy with a micro-level framework focused
on the top officials within the government. I argue that the decision to intervene results from the
policy preferences of elites in the executive branch. Using case studies from four of the post-Cold
War era presidencies, I demonstrate the role that U.S. elite policy preferences have played in the
decision to intervene.
Methods and Data
To select cases for my study, I employed the pathway case method. John Gerring (2008)
describes the pathway case as one focused on a single causal factor, where this variable is isolated
to study its distinct effect on the dependent variable.55 Arguing for its utility, Gerring writes that
this type of case “is useful principally for elucidating causal mechanisms rather than verifying or
falsifying general propositions.”56 I believe that this method of case selection is appropriate for my
investigation into American intervention practices because I am interested in a single causal
factor—the preferences of executive branch elites—on the dependent variable—the decision to
intervene. According to King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), “framing a case study around an
explanatory question may lead to more focused and relevant description, even if the study is
ultimately thwarted in its attempt to provide even a single valid causal inference.” 57 Despite the
pathway case’s weakness in the verification or falsification of general theories, I argue that the

54

Saunders, “Transformative,” 121.
John Gerring, “Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques,” in The Oxford
Handbook of Political Methodology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 664.
56
Ibid, 666.
57 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative
Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 45.
55

11

explanatory value in comparative case studies provides sufficient support to my theory of U.S.
intervention.
As I wish to examine American intervention behavior in the post-Cold War era, I have
decided to select an intervention from each presidency in that period, beginning with that of George
H.W. Bush and ending with the tenure of Barack Obama. The U.S. intervention in the First Gulf
War is an important case to study, as it is following this conflict that Bush, Sr., declared the new
world order based on U.S.-led multilateralism and respect for human rights.58 During Bill Clinton’s
administration, the intervention of interest is in the Balkans, specifically American involvement in
the war in Bosnia. This is an important case for study due to the initial reluctance of policymakers
to intervene, and because of the important leadership role the U.S. eventually played in the
multilateral intervention and peace settlement. The intervention during the second Bush
administration I chose is the 2003 invasion of Iraq, especially because the debate within the top
echelons of the government has been widely reported, providing a strong example of the pathway
case. The Libyan intervention during Obama’s administration is a worthwhile study in a similar
fashion, as it is well-known that the decision to intervene was hotly debated within the executive
branch.
My argument aims to explain why the U.S. intervenes in some situations and not in others.
To fulfill the second part of my claim and juxtapose with the positive cases of intervention, I
selected three instances of non-interference to also investigate. During the George H.W. Bush
administration, some foreign policy hawks were angered at the decision to leave Saddam Hussein’s
regime intact after the end of combat operations in Operation Desert Storm. In the Clinton White
House, advisors were divided and initially reluctant to get involved in the Balkan morass, dubbed

58

“Transcript of President Bush’s Address.”
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“the problem from hell.”59 Finally, I decided to investigate American inaction in Syria, once again
due to administration infighting among Obama’s officials, despite the crossing of the “red line”
and the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime.60
Marc Ventresca and John Mohr (2002) define archival methods as “those that involve the
study of historical documents: that is, documents created at some point in the relatively distant
past, providing us with access that we might not otherwise have to the organizations, individuals,
and events of that earlier time.” 61 They continue, adding that in the digital era, “archival methods
can also be applied to the analysis of digital texts including electronic databases, emails, and web
pages.”62 The archived collections of the administrations of interest are an important source of
evidence for my argument. This material includes memorandums, notes, and recorded minutes
from meetings and public letters, among others.
However, my research was limited by two different types of constraints: classification
issues and physical access. Due to the sensitive nature of the information that I sought, many
pertinent documents had still yet to be declassified, especially regarding the relatively recent
presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. When documents were declassified,
sometimes they were only partially so, giving me an incomplete picture of behind-the-scenes
decision making. In terms of physical constraints, many of the primary source documents I would
have been interested in are only available in the physical location of the archived collection, such

59

Thomas L. Friedman, “Bosnia Reconsidered; Where Candidate Clinton Saw a Challenge The President Sees an
Insoluble Quagmire,” New York Times, April 8, 1993,
https://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/08/world/bosnia-reconsidered-where-candidate-clinton-saw-challengepresident-sees.html.
60 Patrice Taddonio, “‘The President Blinked’: Why Obama Changed Course on the ‘Red Line’ in Syria,” PBS
Frontline, May 25, 2015, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-president-blinked-why-obamachanged-course-on-the-red-line-in-syria/.
61
Marc J. Ventresca and John W. Mohr, “Archival Research Methods,” in The Blackwell Companion to
Organizations (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2002), 805.
62 Ventresca and Mohr, “Archival,” 805.
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as the presidential library or the National Archives. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, access to
physical collections was extremely limited, if available at all due to city and state restrictions.
Nevertheless, I was able to access a great deal of relevant material through records
published online through the official libraries and through George Washington University’s
National Security Archive. I also depended upon written works, including memoirs of
administration officials and journalistic accounts of executive decision making. Opinion pieces
authored by and interviews with policymakers, before and during the interventions under study
here, were also useful in uncovering the policy preferences of elites when primary archival material
was unavailable.
U.S. intervention in Kuwait, Bosnia, Iraq, and Libya
The Persian Gulf War, 1990-91
In late July of 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein began amassing troops near the border
with its southern neighbor, Kuwait, with some estimations claiming as many as 120,000 troops.63
Tensions between the two states had been escalating, following disputes about oil prices, territory,
and debt from the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, in which Kuwait aided Iraq.64 Despite efforts by others
in the Middle East to avoid a crisis, mediation talks broke down on August 1. In the early hours of
the following morning, Iraqi troops marched into Kuwait, capturing its capital and assuming
control of its valuable oilfields.65
On the morning of August 2, President Bush spoke to reporters in the White House Cabinet
room prior to a National Security Council (NSC) meeting concerning the Iraqi invasion. A brief

63

R.w. Apple Jr., “Invading Iraqis Seize Kuwait and Its Oil; U.S. Condemns Attack, Urges United Action,” New
York Times, August 3, 1990, https://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/03/world/worldspecial/invading-iraqisseize-kuwait-and-its-oil-us-condemns.html?searchResultPosition=4.
64 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 565.
65 Apple Jr., “Invading.”

14

interaction with Helen Thomas from United Press International purportedly shows Bush’s thinking
at the time in terms of a U.S. response. When asked if he was considering intervention to counter
Saddam’s transgression against Kuwait, Bush was guarded, asserting that the administration was
not prepared to intervene or send American troops abroad, while also maintaining that he would
not be forthcoming with such information even if the opposite were true. 66 Taking Mr. Bush at his
word, we can assume that a military intervention was not on the table during the early stages of
the Gulf conflict.
In the meeting that followed this exchange, the president and his advisors discussed
international reactions, the effect on oil production, and potential military strategy, as reported by
the partially declassified minutes.67 Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Richard
Darman, emphasized a distinction between Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and a potential attack against
Saudi Arabia, a much closer U.S. ally and greater producer of oil. 68 Then Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell was the first in the meeting to emphasize the “great national interest”
in both objectives.69 He describes two operations developed by the JCS and the commander-inchief of central command if a military route is favored: “tier one” is a single precise attack on Iraqi
forces in response to the annexation of Kuwait, short of a full-scale invasion; “tier two” involved
a much more elaborate exercise, including American boots on the ground to defend Saudi Arabia
and liberate Kuwait, if desired. 70

66

“Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” Public Papers, George Bush
Presidential Library and Museum, August 2, 1990, https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/publicpapers/2123.
67 Meeting of the NSC/Deputy Committee Meeting, “Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” minutes. 2 August 1990, Richard
N. Hass Files, The National Security Archive, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/24306-nationalsecurity-council-meeting-august-2-1990.
68 Ibid, p. 6.
69 Ibid.
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However, U.S. strategy in the Persian Gulf remained unclear. The following day on the
South Lawn of the White House, the president once again spoke to the U.S. press about the ongoing
invasion of Kuwait. There he stated that “all options are open -- economic and otherwise,”71 in an
apparent contradiction to his previous statements. However, during a news conference on August
8, the president maintained that the U.S. troops sent to Saudi Arabia were defensive in nature, and
that it was “not the mission to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait,” instead relying on economic
sanctions to accomplish that objective.72 He continued, maintaining that the U.S. was “not in a
war” and that American troops were only sent “to defend Saudi Arabia.” 73
Despite these numerous public assertions, three days later, in another exchange between
the president and the press, the U.S. purpose in the Gulf appeared to have changed. When asked
about the administration’s strategy, Bush told reporters that “the goal is to get Iraq out, obviously,
of Kuwait and have the legitimate rulers return. That is the goal.” 74 While continuing to stress the
importance of economic sanctions in this objective, an emphasis on the liberation of Kuwait was
new, now more than just a mere afterthought. By the 14th, ejecting Saddam’s forces from Kuwait
took the main stage as the primary U.S. goal in the Persian Gulf crisis. Responding to an inquiry
about his reaction to a proposal from Saddam to negotiate, Bush criticized it, insisting that “it did
not address itself to the fundamental problem” and that Iraq must “get out of Kuwait and they’ve
got to let the rightful rulers return.” 75
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As the weeks wore on and a diplomatic resolution appeared further and further out of reach,
the rhetoric surrounding the U.S. mission in the Gulf took on a different tone. During a press
conference at the White House Briefing Room on November 8, the president told reporters that
offensive forces were officially deployed to Saudi Arabia, marking a distinct shift in the objective
of American troops in the Persian Gulf. 76 In a letter to Congress on the 16th, Bush justified the
deployment, arguing that the additional forces “will ensure that the coalition has an adequate
offensive military option should that be necessary to achieve our common goals.”77 By the end of
the month, due to extensive U.S. lobbying,78 the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 678, authorizing member states to employ “all necessary means” to ensure Iraqi
compliance with prior resolutions that demanded its unconditional exit from Kuwait by January
15, 1991.79
What changed? Why did the U.S. objective shift from defending Saudi Arabia from a
potential Iraqi invasion to expelling Saddam’s forces from Kuwait and ending the occupation? I
argue that it was a concerted effort by a group of policymakers—NSC advisor Scowcroft,
Chairmen of the JCS General Powell, and Secretary of State Baker and of Defense Cheney—that
influenced official policy from a defensive to an offensive position in the Gulf. We can see the
early signs of a pivot toward Kuwait liberation just two days after the initial invasion. During a
morning meeting of the NSC at Camp David on August 4, administration officials met once again
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to discuss potential military responses to Iraqi aggression. General Powell is the first official,
according to the meeting’s minutes, who mentions U.S. forces marching into Kuwait following
the Iraqi invasion. He describes “a longstanding plan defined over the last few weeks,” telling the
president that the plan would “achieve the mission of defending Saudi Arabia and a basis for
moving north into Kuwait.” 80 He is confident in an American victory, arguing that “Saddam does
not want to mess with us. Therefore, I believe we need to get the Americans in - we need to show
the flag.”81 While President Bush reiterates that the main objective of U.S. policy would be to
protect and defend Saudi Arabia from Iraqi forces and retaliation, his advisors are not all in
agreement.82 Secretary Baker insists that the administration should be focused on ejecting
Saddam’s troops from Kuwait, with Secretary Cheney agreeing, asserting that they “can’t let
Saddam hold on to Kuwait.” 83 NSC advisor Scowcroft is also supportive of the Kuwaiti liberation
policy objective, stating that “our first goal is to get [Saddam] out of Kuwait.” 84 Almost from the
outset of the invasion and annexation, these four policy advisors emphasized the liberation of
Kuwait as a crucial American foreign policy goal, and carried enormous influence with the
president to shape the country’s intervention strategy.
Scowcroft recalls disbelief in reaction to the general tenor of the first NSC meeting on the
Iraqi invasion, writing that he was “frankly appalled at the undertone of the discussion, which
suggested resignation to the invasion.”85 According to Scowcroft, when consulting with the
president on last minute speech changes for his address in Aspen that same day, “it became obvious
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to me that the president was prepared to use force to evict Saddam from Kuwait if it became
necessary.”86 However, according to Bush himself, the decision was not as clear-cut. Bush
describes an interaction with General Powell in which Powell “remarked that he felt I really had
declared war on Iraq that Sunday [August 5] ...In retrospect, I don’t know if I had yet determined
that the use of force would be required.” 87 In mid-August, after a meeting with the Saudis, Bush
was still unsure about the use of force to eject Saddam from Kuwait, believing it to be too soon to
consider military operations.88
NSC Advisor Scowcroft remembers a discussion around the unilateral use of force to expel
the Iraqis, describing Robert Gates, Cheney, and himself as “the hard-liners...urging that we had
to act, even...unilaterally.” 89 Bush writes that Secretary Cheney was an early advocate for the use
of force and was “probably ahead of his military on this.” 90 During another meeting of the NSC
on October 11, the core staff went over the military options for an offensive operation in the Gulf. 91
General Powell was not optimistic about the success of an air campaign and insisted that American
boots on the ground would be necessary to liberate Kuwait. 92 By the end of August, the president
had shifted his focus more and more to the use of force, claiming that he was unable to imagine
Saddam leaving Kuwait without military intervention.93 Scowcroft confirms this, arguing that, by
October, it was clear to him that the president believed military force was the only possible course
of action to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwaiti soil. 94
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While Secretary Baker was a staunch supporter of the liberation of Kuwait, as a diplomat,
he was more hesitant to immediately support military action over a multilateral United Nationsbased effort. Bush recollects Baker as “reluctant” to consider the use of force and strongly
advocated for the use of diplomacy and economic sanctions to “get the job done.” 95 He continues,
writing that Baker “never backed away from any decision to use force or planning for it, but he
advised pushing the diplomatic course first and giving sanctions more time.” 96 Bush was
supportive of Baker’s diplomatic efforts, encouraging him to work with the Soviets for a draft
resolution, which would become Security Council Resolution 678, to authorize the use of force to
ensure Iraqi compliance with previous rulings by January 15, 1991.97 The president described the
new resolution as “a tremendous breakthrough” that strengthened the international coalition and
kept the Soviet Union in line with American goals. 98 The effect of Baker’s diplomatic efforts on
the administration’s intervention strategy was clear. Bush was determined to work with Gorbachev
and give the sanctions as much time as possible to attempt to coerce Saddam into withdrawing
from Kuwait without unnecessarily sending American soldiers into the Gulf. After the passage of
the UN resolution, Bush proposed high level meetings between the U.S. and Iraq in a last-ditch
effort to prevent a military confrontation.99 The president wrote in a December 14 diary entry, “I
cannot say that I have made the determination to pull the trigger,” but was resolved to make a clear
decision by the mid-January deadline.100 Shortly after the new year, Bush told his top advisors,
including Baker and Scowcroft, to arrange a final meeting to alert Saddam of American and
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coalition resolve to liberate Kuwait. 101 The January 9 meeting between Baker and Iraqi Foreign
Minister Tariq Aziz represented the final attempt for a peaceful settlement to the Persian Gulf
crisis.102 The encounter was decidedly unproductive but allowed the president to exhaust all other
means of obtaining a non-military resolution.
As the UN-imposed deadline crept closer and closer, last-minute efforts to resolve the crisis
peacefully failed. At seven p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Operation Desert Storm officially
commenced when coalition forces began bombing targets in Iraq and Kuwait. 103 The air campaign
waged for six weeks, followed by 100 hours of fighting by ground forces.104 Offensive military
operations were suspended at midnight on February 28, 1991, formally ending the Persian Gulf
War.105
America’s descent into the “problem from hell,” 1995
Following the death of Josep Tito in 1980, internal political tensions surged in the Balkan
state of Yugoslavia, particularly between Serbia and Croatia and Slovenia. 106 Nationalism and
separatism among Yugoslavia’s six republics grew, culminating in the independence declarations
of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991.107 Caught between Serb and Croat nationalists, the Bosnian
government held a vote on its own independence in early 1992, resulting in an overwhelming
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majority—of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats—supporting independence for the republic.108
Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum, and subsequently declared their own independence and
the formation of a Bosnian Serb state, the Republika Srpska. 109 On April 6, 1992, after BosniaHerzegovina received official recognition from both the UN and the European Commission (EC),
Bosnian Serbs shelled the majority Muslim capital of Sarajevo, violently marking the start of the
conflict in Bosnia.110
Presidential candidate Bill Clinton was an early supporter of U.S. military involvement in
the Bosnian war.111 Campaigning against a reluctant Bush, Clinton vowed to use American power
to put an end to the ethnic cleansing in the Balkans.112 He advocated for limited air strikes in
defense of humanitarian agencies working in the region and called on the U.S. military to aid the
effort.113 He even went as far as to support lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian
government, which disproportionately affected the Bosnian Muslims. 114 In the first months of his
presidency, Clinton’s determination to help end the crisis in Bosnia did not wane. In a February
1993 meeting of the Principals Committee, Clinton told his advisors that the U.S. must take a
leadership role in the crisis.115 After the Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica in March, concern
began to mount in the U.S. about the lack of viability of a political resolution. 116 A Principals
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meeting toward the end of the month resulted in two policy options: the lift and strike plan, which
was opposed by America’s European allies, or a cease-fire designed to protect the Bosniaks.117
Clinton’s policy advisors were divided. While Vice President Al Gore and UN Ambassador
Madeleine Albright supported air strikes on Bosnian Serb targets, National Security Advisor
Anthony Lake and Secretary of State Warren Christopher favored the lifting of the arms embargo
and limited air strikes. 118 The cease-fire policy was favored by the Defense Department, including
its secretary, Les Aspin. 119 Yet other military experts, including then Chairman of the JCS General
Powell and NATO Supreme Commander General John Shalikashvili, claimed that a significant
number of ground troops would be needed to support an air strikes operation. 120 By May of 1993,
it appeared as though most of the administration’s key players had come to support the lift and
strike plan, except for Secretary Aspin, who still favored a cease-fire.121 However, Clinton’s
support for the lift and strike option quickly shriveled up as he learned of European opposition to
the plan, undermining Christopher’s diplomatic mission to rally the allies around the military
intervention.122 American strategy toward Bosnia swung away from intervention and back to the
Bush policy of containment.123
With the failure of the lift and strike policy, the U.S. deferred to Europe in addressing the
Bosnian war.124 Despite consistent outrage over the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia, the
administration refused to take a more forceful stance without the backing of Europe, especially
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that of the United Kingdom and France whose troops were on the ground as part of UNPROFOR.
In May of 1993, the U.S. joined the U.K., France, Spain, and Russia to create the Joint Action Plan
that established “safe areas” to protect the “besieged Muslims in and around six Bosnian cities”
and called for an influx of UN humanitarian troops. 125 However, in a move that weakened
European resolve to use force, Bosnian Serbs temporarily discontinued their onslaught against the
safe havens, only to ramp up the assaults once again by the end of the year.126
In a late January 1994 meeting between the president and his top foreign policy officials,
it was decided that the United States must take a more active leadership role in facilitating
negotiations and consider the use of air power to bring an end to the conflict. 127 The next month
saw the Sarajevo Ultimatum after a brutal attack on a marketplace that left 68 people dead and
more injured.128 In the aftermath, the Clinton administration reworked a French proposal to suggest
the establishment of a demilitarized zone around Sarajevo and demanded that all parties, including
the Bosniaks, hand over “heavy weapons” to UN-controlled forces by February 21.129 The U.S.
continued to take a leading role in settlement talks, as demonstrated in the success of the
Washington Agreement in March, which put forward the formation of a Bosnian Muslim-Croat
federation and finally achieved the goal of isolating the Serbs in negotiations.130
Unfortunately, the feeling of triumph by the Clinton White House did not last long.
Tensions between NATO member states were coming to a head in what would be called “the worst
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crisis within the Atlantic since 1956.”131 The U.S.’s refusal to supply American boots on the
ground to assist UNPROFOR despite its calls for the lift and strike policy angered some allies who
believed the U.S. was not “burden sharing.” 132 The rift also threatened a cohesive strategy for the
Bosnian conflict, with France calling for the provision of U.S. troops to acquiesce to air strikes
and the U.K. refusing to accept the lifting of the arms embargo. 133 Rather than risk the failure of
the NATO alliance, the U.S. backed off its air strikes proposal, once again deferring to the
Europeans and adopting a policy of conflict containment.134
When the conflict showed no signs of reaching a peaceful conclusion, especially after the
Bosnian Serb offensives during the summer of 1994, NATO officials began reviewing contingency
plans for the withdrawal and rescue of vulnerable UNPROFOR troops, should the situation
deteriorate further.135 Due to the administration’s priority of alliance unity, the U.S. had also
implicitly decided that America’s responsibility to the alliance “could mean nothing less than that
the United States would have to participate, with troops on the ground” in any withdrawal
operation.136 With UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s call for a review of the organization’s
peacekeeping operation in May 1995, the specter of American boots on the ground in the Balkans
steadily grew.137 While some officials, especially in the State Department, feared such implications
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of a removal of UNPROFOR forces, others, including the president, saw an opportunity to finally
put an end to the war.138
Why did the Clinton administration change its policy? Who convinced the president that a
more active and forceful intervention strategy was needed? It wasn’t until late 1994-early 1995
when the U.S. began to seriously contemplate using military force, via a bombing campaign, to
end the conflict.139 Nevertheless, many administration officials were still wary of involving U.S.
troops directly in the conflict. In late February 1995, U.S. policy was still to “muddle through
while supporting the Bosnians,” unwilling to further upset NATO allies.140 In spite of this
reluctance, according to a summary of the February 21 meeting of the Principals Committee, top
administration officials “discussed options for the longer term should diplomatic efforts fail to
achieve a negotiated settlement.”141
That same month, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake commissioned a review of all
policy options, given the likely outcome of continued fighting in the spring. 142 The Bosnia
Interagency Working Group (IWG) presented four options: continue with the status quo, pursue
active containment, quarantine the Bosnian Serbs, and lift and strike, including arming and training
Bosniak forces.143 The policy paper from the IWG was presented at another Principals Committee
meeting in March.144 The top officials at the State Department supported a continuation of current
U.S. policy, prioritizing the prevention of an escalation in the conflict as the cease-fire negotiated

138

Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 60-61.
Larres, “‘Bloody as Hell,’” 179.
140 National Security Council et al., “PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia,
February 1995 [1],” Clinton Digital Library, accessed March 18, 2022,
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/72191.
141 Ibid.
142 Daddler, Getting to Dayton, 87.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
139

26

by Carter was due to expire.145 The Pentagon favored the adoption of a neutral stance, and the NSC
staff advocated for lifting the arms embargo multilaterally. 146
Secretary Christopher’s preference for a diplomatic settlement and opposition to U.S.
military involvement was incredibly influential in determining American intervention strategy,
particularly during the first years of the Clinton presidency. In an appearance on CBS News’s Face
the Nation in March of 1993, Christopher described the conflict in the Balkans as “a problem from
hell” and that the U.S. “simply doesn’t have the means to make people in that region of the world
like each other.”147 The failure of his European trip to advance the U.S. policy of lift and strike
had a significant effect on Christopher’s policy prescriptions and subsequently on American
intervention strategy.148 Secretary Christopher moved to “rein in” the U.S.’s Bosnia policy, going
so far as to adopt the language of previous detractors. 149
UN Ambassador Albright was the most hawkish foreign policy advisor throughout the
Bosnian conflict.150 She was consistently concerned with the perception of American weakness as
the violence continued to escalate, and often insisted upon a more aggressive strategy when
asked.151 As early as April 1993, in a memo to the president, she pushed for the administration to
support air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs and to bomb the routes used by Serbia to get around
the arms embargo.152 In an August 3, 1995, memorandum for Lake, Albright expressed support
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for the national security advisor’s altered lift and strike policy.153 She also described dismay at the
broader administration’s reluctance to take a more involved role in the Balkan crisis, fearing it
“has placed at risk our leadership of the post Cold War world.” 154 She tells Lake that the U.S.
“must base our plan on using military pressure” because “our only successes have come when the
Bosnian Serbs faced a credible threat of military force.” 155 Furthermore, she asserts that American
air power should be used “to help the Bosnians by changing the balance of power.” 156
Lake, along with his deputy Sandy Berger, served as one of Clinton’s top foreign policy
consultants during the 1992 presidential campaign. Together, they were responsible for the
campaign’s strong stance on Bosnia, aimed at demonstrating the leadership failure of the Bush
administration during the early months of the Balkan crisis.157 Lake’s influence did not end on the
campaign trail, however. In his position as the president’s National Security Advisor, he initiated
a Bosnian policy review and oversaw the creation of the endgame strategy, which would eventually
become the backbone of the U.S. intervention strategy toward the end of the conflict. In an
interview with PBS Frontline, Lake describes the endgame strategy he developed with a few other
administration officials, saying that “it is time to put a stop to this, period, whatever the cost.” 158
According to Lake, the president was aware of the development of this strategy beginning in March
of 1995 as the policy began to take shape.159 During his August trip to rally allied support, Lake
told the Europeans that the U.S. “believed it was time to allow the UN mission in Bosnia to collapse
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if it had to” to prevent further hostage-taking and that “we were going to use much more vigorous
bombing if necessary” to reach a settlement.160
In an August 5, 1995, memorandum to the president, Lake summarized the arguments
presented in policy papers by Clinton’s top advisors before a scheduled meeting of the Foreign
Policy Group.161 Lake noted points of agreement between himself and Ambassador Albright,
writing that they both support preservation of a Bosnian state where the Muslims and Croats
control about half of the territory and that “anything less would be tantamount to” rewarding
Serbian aggression.162 Lake and Albright were early allies in the administration, both favoring a
more active approach to the war in Bosnia. 163 At the July 17 Principals meeting, Lake had proposed
the beginnings of the endgame strategy, including the establishment of an intact Bosnian state, and
Albright voiced her full support, even of the smaller details of the plan. 164 Meanwhile, Secretary
Christopher was warier, worried that the potential costs of failure “loomed larger than the possible
benefits” due to insufficient U.S. leverage.165 In the early August memo, Lake also describes the
alternative proposals by State and Defense, which advocated a “more limited commitment,”
echoing Christopher’s concerns.166 In the end, despite the lack of enthusiasm from the State
Department, President Clinton expressed support for both Albright’s and Lake’s approach.167 The
next day’s meeting saw Clinton formally endorse Lake’s endgame strategy and send his National
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Security Advisor across the Atlantic to inform Europe of his new, and firm, intervention policy for
Bosnia.168
Saddam Revisited, 2003
On March 17, 2003, President George W. Bush stood in the Cross Hall at the White House
as he addressed the nation, issuing an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and threatening military force
if the Iraqi leader and his sons refused to leave their country.169 Two days later, American troops
crossed the Iraqi border from Kuwait, officially signaling the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 170
Within three weeks, facing little or weak resistance, U.S. and allied troops had reached Baghdad
and toppled Saddam’s regime.171 At the beginning of May, President Bush appeared in front of a
“mission accomplished” banner aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln and declared the formal end of
major combat operations in Iraq.172 However, the war was far from over, and the region forever
changed.
The September 11 attacks in 2001 shocked the world and fundamentally shifted the foreign
policy objectives of the George W. Bush administration. The post-9/11 world saw a U.S. foreign
policy dominated by concerns over weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and state-sponsored
terrorism, with Iraq firmly in the crosshairs. 173 While official planning for regime change occurred
between 2002 and 2003, some administration officials had their eyes on an Iraq free from Saddam
Hussein for years, even as far back as Operation Desert Storm. 174
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Since the end of the first Gulf War, many in America’s foreign policy sector believed that
Saddam posed a major threat to U.S. national interests and the broader international system. During
the years between the Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, all three administrations had similar
initial policies toward Iraq: a combination of containment and regime change. 175 In the first few
months of George W. Bush’s presidency, it appeared as though the policies of the previous
administrations toward Iraq were continuing, namely international sanctions and weapons
inspections.176 However, the importance of regime change in U.S. policy grew compared to its
containment counterpart prior to the 2003 invasion. 177 Despite not becoming official U.S. strategy
until the passage of the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act, regime change plagued the minds of
administration officials. Policymakers were “clearly interested in removing Saddam from power
even before the first Gulf War ended.” 178
Even some officials within the first Bush White House were critical of the decision to
refrain from toppling Saddam.179 In a November 1997 op-ed in the Washington Post, Zalmay
Khalilzad and Paul Wolfowitz argued that Saddam “will continue to pose a threat to the security
and stability of a large and important part of the world as long as he remains in power.”180 They
suggested that the U.S. “consider a comprehensive new strategy aimed at promoting a change of
regime in Baghdad.”181 George W. Bush, who would order the invasion of Iraq that his father
refused to do, told a family friend in 1998 that his father had “made a mistake not going into Iraq
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when he had an approval rating in the nineties. If I’m ever in the situation, I’ll use it—I’ll spend
my political capital.”182 The rumblings of Iraqi regime change began well before the hijacking of
four passenger airlines spawned the global War on Terror.
The primary drivers of America’s intervention strategy during the second Bush
administration were a group of policymakers known as neoconservatives. Long before George W.
Bush walked into the White House, neoconservatives in and around the government were
campaigning against Saddam Hussein and supporting a strategy of regime change, including
through the funding of Iraqi opposition groups like the Iraqi National Congress. 183 Most
prominently, this cadre of executive branch elites included Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld,
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and Vice President Dick Cheney. In describing these
“national security conservatives,” Bob Woodward wrote that these policymakers were obsessed
with the threat that Saddam Hussein posed to the U.S. and to the world and argued that any serious
counterterrorism policy must include the Iraqi president as a target. 184 Richard Clarke, a former
U.S. counterterrorism official, described rationales for the 2003 invasion attributed to Cheney,
Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and the president, including the intention “to clean up the mess left by the
first Bush administration when, in 1991, it let Saddam Hussein consolidate power and slaughter
opponents after the first U.S.-Iraq war.” 185
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld did not keep his preference for regime change a secret. As
a member of the neoconservative group, the Project for the New American Century, he signed on
to a letter to President Clinton which called for a new strategy toward Iraq, one that involved
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“removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power.”186 In a memorandum to National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice on July 27, 2001, Rumsfeld discussed background information
on Iraq and policy proposals toward Saddam’s regime, along with his comments. He warned of
Iraqi WMDs, writing that “the risks of a serious regime-change policy must be weighed against
the certainty of the danger of an increasingly bold and nuclear-armed Saddam in the near future.” 187
He continued, suggesting that “if Saddam’s regime were ousted, we would have a much-improved
position in the region and elsewhere.”188 Notes from a November 27, 2001, meeting between
Secretary Rumsfeld and CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks show the priority given
to regime change in the administration’s Iraq intervention strategy. The document, which was
prepared with the assistance of senior Defense Department officials, including Paul Wolfowitz,
lists the steps necessary for “building momentum for regime change.” 189 Moreover, under the
heading of “decapitation of government,” Rumsfeld had written “do early.” 190 In a memorandum
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 12, 2002, Rumsfeld asked for a proposal to
train opposition groups within Iraq “to enable them to be prepared to participate in operations
aimed at replacing the Saddam Hussein regime.” 191
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Paul Wolfowitz, who served under the first President Bush as the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, had long championed Iraqi regime change before the 2003 invasion. Wolfowitz
was an outspoken critic of the decision to leave Saddam in power following the end of combat
operations in the First Gulf War. 192 In a 1992 “Defense Planning Guidance” document leaked to
the New York Times, authored by Wolfowitz, the case was made for “using military force, if
necessary, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons...in such countries as North Korea,
Iraq,” among others.193 Wolfowitz lambasted the Clinton administration’s policy toward Iraq in
1996, arguing that Iraq is crucial to American national security and lamenting that the “U.S. has
virtually abandoned its commitment to protect a besieged people from a bloodthirsty dictator.” 194
Criticizing the Clinton White House for not protecting the Iraqi opposition in the northern parts of
the country, he wrote that “it will be much more difficult to go beyond a containment strategy” but
“no less necessary.”195 In the 1997 Washington Post opinion piece written with Khalilzad,
Wolfowitz argued for a reevaluation of policy toward Iraq to include the “removal of Saddam’s
regime.”196 Khalilzad and Wolfowitz claimed that a new strategy “combined with concrete
measures to get rid of Saddam will restore our credibility” with Iraqis and in the region more
broadly.197 Clarke recalled that Wolfowitz “had urged a focus on Iraqi-sponsored terrorism” in the
administration’s early meetings on terrorism.198
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Unlike his fellow neoconservatives, Vice President Dick Cheney was not immediately
convinced to support regime change in Iraq following the First Gulf War. In a 1995 interview with
PBS Frontline, Cheney remarked that he “was not an enthusiast about getting U.S. forces and going
into Iraq.”199 He continued, “the idea of going into Baghdad, for example, or trying to topple the
regime wasn’t anything I was enthusiastic about.” 200 However, according to Bob Woodward, the
incoming Vice President had changed his views on Iraq upon entering the White House. In a
message to Clinton’s outgoing defense secretary, Cheney stressed the importance of briefing
George W. Bush on “Iraq and different options.”201 As head of the Pentagon during the first Bush
administration, Cheney “harbored a deep sense of unfinished business about Iraq.”202
Despite his 1998 harsh comments, Bush had not made up his mind to immediately pursue
the ousting of Saddam in Iraq. During the 2000 presidential campaign, then Governor Bush “gave
no indication that he or his advisors were planning to remove Saddam via a military invasion.” 203
In an interview with PBS, Kenneth Pollack, an NSC staffer from 1995-96 and again from 19992001, maintained that regime change in Iraq was not the original policy of the young George W.
Bush administration.204 According to Pollack, prior to the September 11 attacks, “the tide had
swung very much against that group of far-right conservatives who had been arguing for Iraq.” 205
However, after 9/11, the neoconservative hawks within the administration seized upon the new
war on terrorism “to resurrect their policy of trying to go after Saddam Hussein and a regime
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change in Iraq.”206 For example, Clarke recalled a brief meeting with the president on the evening
of September 12, 2001, where Bush testily demanded his advisers “look into Iraq, Saddam.” 207
One NSC staff member lamented, “Wolfowitz got to him.” 208 The 2001 terrorist attacks
fundamentally transformed the foreign policy objectives of the Bush administration, placing
regime change in Iraq near the very top of the list.
Yet not all top administration officials were championing a unilateral regime change in
Iraq. In an October 29, 2002, memo to Cheney, Powell, Rumsfeld and others, National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice listed strategy objectives toward Iraq, including the need to “secure
UNSC approval if possible.” 209 Multilateralism was also an element of the strategy, as Rice
suggested that the administration “pursue our goals and objectives with a coalition of committed
countries.”210 Dennis Ross, an official in both the first Bush and Clinton administrations, described
the influence of Secretary of State Colin Powell within the administration’s debate on Iraq. He told
PBS that “in terms of the shaping of the approach to Iraq, [Powell] has played a significant role.
Going to the Security Council was clearly his advice and his suggestion.” 211 He continued,
“Getting a Security Council resolution, I think, was obviously where he extended enormous
efforts.”212 To the chagrin of some of the more hawkish members of the ad ministration, in his
September 12, 2002, speech to the UN General Assembly, President Bush told the world that the
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U.S. “will work with the UN Security Council to meet our common challenge” and will work with
the body “for the necessary resolutions.”213
Ultimately, the U.S. failed to secure a second UN resolution to authorize force against
Iraq.214 Despite this, U.S. and coalition forces began striking selected military targets in Iraq’s
capital in the early hours of March 20, 2003.215 The operation in Iraq did not establish a new
democratic American ally or secure a friendly source of natural resources. Today, almost twenty
years after the president declared an official end to combat operations in Iraq on that aircraft carrier
in San Diego, roughly 2,500 troops remain in a ravaged and devastated Iraq.216
R2P’s Test in Libya, 2011
In 2011, a revolutionary spirit swept through the Middle East and North Africa, toppling
regimes from Tunisia to Egypt and igniting uprisings in states including Syria and Yemen. Libya
was not immune to the popular sentiment. After the Qaddafi regime brutally repressed peaceful
protestors and resorted to violence against civilians, debate about a potential international
response, in accordance with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, began to grow in the
UN Security Council.217 In response to these atrocities, in February 2011, the Council passed
Resolution 1970, imposing sanctions on Qaddafi’s government and banning specific individuals
from travel.218 In March, the Council went even further, adopting Resolution 1973, which closed
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Libyan airspace and “authorized Member States...to take all necessary measures to protect civilians
under threat of attack.”219 Following Resolution 1973, and despite ongoing debate within the
Obama administration, the president “ultimately agreed to military action in Libya.” 220
Throughout the various pro-democracy uprisings that swept across the Middle East in
2011, the U.S. remained largely inactive, disinterested in the prospect of further entrenchment in
the region.221 President Obama was initially reluctant to involve America in yet another conflict in
the Middle East, despite the increasing relevance of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine to the
Libyan crisis.222 However, the civil war proved to be a turning point in Obama’s foreign policy,
shifting the attention away from attending to the previous administration’s mistakes and toward
the rights-based multilateralism laid out in his National Security Strategy. 223 Libya became a test
of this dedication to coalition building and human rights as the news from inside the country
became more and more dire.224
The various uprisings during the Arab Spring divided administration officials, especially
when determining American policy toward the unrest in Libya. Skeptics of intervention included
White House advisors and the top officials at the Pentagon, who cited the protracted conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan as enough reason to refrain from action. 225 Opponents of U.S. intervention
included Defense Secretary Robert Gates, National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon, and
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Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor, John Brennan.226 They argued for a more cautious
approach, claiming that support of the Libyan uprising was not material to the country’s national
security.227 Other officials in the administration were arguing for a different, more hands-on course
of action. These advisors—among them U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice, Special Assistant
to the President Samantha Power, and, ultimately, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton—championed
American intervention to stop the humanitarian crisis and protect civilians. 228
Secretary Gates was one of the loudest critics of American involvement in the Libyan civil
war. Vehemently opposed to further U.S. military action in the region, he worried that a third war
would overburden the defense department’s resources. 229 During an early March congressional
hearing, he warned lawmakers about the implications of establishing a no-fly zone in Libya,
explaining that it “would entail bombing Libya,” an operation that “would require more airplanes
than are available from a single American aircraft carrier.” 230 He also referred to calls for U.S.
intervention as “loose talk.” 231 Gates wrote in his memoir that he was extremely concerned about
“how overstretched and tired our military was, and the possibility of a protracted conflict in
Libya.”232 In an interview with ABC News on March 27, 2011, Gates maintained that Libya under
Qaddafi “did not pose a threat to the United States” before American intervention.233
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Brennan joined the defense secretary in his opposition to U.S. interference in the Libyan
conflict. Brennan specifically argued against U.S. support of the anti-Qaddafi forces, worried
about potential terrorist links between the rebels and al Qaeda.234 Tom Donilon, together with
Gates, advocated for a much more careful strategy to the Arab Spring uprisings, and Libya in
particular, advising the president of the potential risks, including “the cost, logistical complications
and political blow-back of further U.S. military involvement in such a volatile part of the world.” 235
Secretary Clinton originally sided with Gates, Brennan, and Donilon, reluctant to support a
potentially open-ended intervention operation in Libya, concerned with the potential damage to
America’s reputation.236
Ambassador Rice’s worldview has been profoundly shaped by her experience with the
Clinton administration, where she served as a staffer on the National Security Council during the
Rwandan genocide in 1994.237 In a June 2009 speech, at the beginning of her tenure as U.S.
Ambassador to the UN, Rice told the International Peace Institute in Vienna that the U.S.
“welcomes” the R2P doctrine, and that it is “committed as well to doing its part to strengthen the
international human rights architecture.”238 Speaking of her personal beliefs, she said that “the
Responsibility to Protect is a duty that I feel deeply,” continuing, “I believe we must be voices for
action in the face of genocide and mass atrocities, even if we are lonely ones.” 239
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During President Obama’s first term, Samantha Power served on the National Security
Council staff and proved herself to be an outspoken voice in favor of humanitarian intervention.
In her memoir, she depicted Qaddafi’s Libya as “one of the most repressive states in the world”
where “persecution, torture, and summary executions” of political opponents were
commonplace.240 Power, who reported on the atrocities committed during the Bosnian civil war as
a journalist, often drew comparisons between those humanitarian outrages and the chilling reports
coming out of Libya by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.241 She described a March
15 National Security Council meeting regarding the Libyan civil war where the president’s
advisors briefed him about potential U.S. actions. Power advocated for “a civilian protection
mission along the lines of what Susan [Rice] had proposed,”242 which included “striking Qaddafi’s
forces and the land-based weapons they were using to attack civilians.”243
Despite her initial reluctance, Clinton soon changed her mind after allying with top
administration officials also arguing for intervention.244 The secretary of state reportedly
reconsidered her position during an overseas trip, where she learned of broad international support
of military action in Libya, particularly by Arab governments in the region. 245 According to
Power’s recollection, Secretary Clinton, who had met with the Libyan opposition leadership earlier
that day, “threw her considerable influence behind Susan’s recommendation” during the March 15
NSC meeting. 246
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As of March 9, the administration remained steadfast in its position, only committed to
providing humanitarian aid to civilians in Libya.247 However, around the time of Clinton’s trip to
Paris, she and the other officials had persuaded the president to step in.248 The pivotal shift in
intervention policy occurred after the March 15 NSC meeting 249 and rested upon the coalition of
Secretary Clinton, NSC aide Samantha Power, and UN Ambassador Susan Rice.250 The president
appeared to be preoccupied with the humanitarian costs of inaction, asking his advisors “to gauge
the likelihood of mass killings” if the U.S. and others stood on the sidelines as Qaddafi launched
his counteroffensive.251 After the first meeting was dismissed, Obama reconvened his principals
to discuss concrete policy options later that night.252 Ambassador Rice revealed to Power in a
phone call that the president had sided with the interventionists, conditioned on the passage of a
Security Council resolution. 253 Gates described a March 17 meeting with the president where he
justified the decision to intervene, arguing that the U.S. “couldn’t stand idly by in the face of a
potential humanitarian disaster.”254 In remarks to the media the following day, marking the passage
of Resolution 1973, President Obama informed the nation of the administration’s dedication to
“protecting innocent civilians with Libya, and holding the Qaddafi regime accountable” and
described American leadership in the coalition as “essential.”255
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After the decision had been made, the administration moved quickly, with U.S. forces
targeting the air defenses of Qaddafi’s regime on March 19. 256 The United States soon turned over
command of the bombing campaign to coalition forces under NATO, in a mission codenamed
“Operation Unified Protector.”257 In support of Operation Unified Protector, the president also
allegedly supported the deployment of “covert military support to Libyan opposition groups.” 258
While administration officials declared the intervention “resoundingly successful,” as it removed
Qaddafi from power while keeping American troops off the ground, “the country’s security
situation quickly deteriorated,” and never recovered. 259
Non-intervention in Iraq, Bosnia, and Syria
No Regime Change in Iraq, 1991
As combat operations concluded in February 1991, the Bush White House refrained from
action not outlined in the resolutions passed by the Security Council. The president did not order
a full-scale invasion, nor did U.S. and coalition forces depose Hussein or occupy Iraq. 260
Furthermore, instead of destroying the Iraqi army and the Iraqi Republican Guard, the
administration terminated Operation Desert Storm, leaving the military largely intact and Saddam
in power,261 a decision the president’s son would have to reckon with during his own stint as
commander-in-chief twelve years later.
During an exchange with reporters on August 11, 1990, Bush was asked about what
measures the administration was willing to take to fulfill its objectives in the Gulf, “including
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overthrowing Saddam Hussein.”262 Bush was reserved in his response, replying that he would “just
leave it sit out there, and everybody can figure it out.” 263 Another reporter pushed for clarification,
asking if the U.S. was “prepared in any way” to support the ousting of Saddam as Iraqi president,
to which Bush replied in the negative.264 He did, however, express support for Iraqi opposition to
“do something about” Saddam leaving so Iraq could “live peacefully in the community of
nations.”265 In a press conference later that same month, the president reiterated the
administration’s support of a potential internal rebellion in Iraq, telling the press that “it wouldn’t
disappoint me if the Iraqis got up and said, look, this man is our problem.”266
According to General Powell, the Bush administration “never had a plan that said we were
going to go to Baghdad and actually remove this guy from power...because we had no international
authority for that, we had no agreement with the coalition.” 267 Bush and Scowcroft wrote that
regime change was not a viable option after Desert Storm, as it “would have violated our guideline
about not changing objectives in midstream” and “would have incurred incalculable human and
political costs.” 268 Furthermore, they argued that in the “new world order,” an American
occupation of Iraq “would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression
that we hoped to establish” after the end of the Cold War. 269
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Top officials at the defense department defended the move to retreat, claiming that
attacking the fleeing Iraqi soldiers would “sully the American-led victory and poison the postwar
environment.”270 General Powell argued, “‘we don’t want to be seen as killing for the sake of
killing.’”271 Defense Secretary Cheney echoed this view, telling PBS in an interview that “there
was a limit to how long you could continue the bloodshed without having it look as though we
were asking our troops to do something we probably shouldn’t ask them to do.”272
The decision to withdraw coalition troops and leave Saddam in power was not universally
welcomed. Zalmary Khalilzad and Paul Wolfowitz, who both served in the department of defense
during the first Bush administration, argued in a 1997 op-ed that U.S. policy should include regime
change in Iraq.273 In an April 1992 article, Angelo Codevilla lambasted Bush’s decision to leave
the Iraqi president in power, criticizing the U.S. for leaving Saddam “well-positioned to resume
both his military and his political threats.” 274 Others were outraged at decisions to leave Saddam’s
elite Republican Guard intact275 and let the Iraqi military “retain helicopter flights ‘to carry
officials’ because of the bombed out bridges and roads” following the end of Operation Desert
Storm.276 Richard Clarke, who served in Bush’s state department, argued that coalition forces
“should have continued the war for a day or week to destroy the Republican Guard.” 277
Furthermore, the helicopters retained by Iraqi forces were subsequently used by Saddam to
suppress uprisings and attack civilians.278
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Instead of marching into Iraq and imposing regime change, the U.S. bolstered its military
presence in neighboring states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar and instituted a no-fly zone over parts
of Iraqi territory to protect Kurdish fighters that had allied with the coalition. 279 While some praised
the Bush administration’s constraint, others criticized the president for not going further and
“accused him of not finishing the job.”280 Despite the loud calls for Hussein’s removal, even from
within Bush’s own administration, the U.S. left him in power to counterbalance against Iran. 281
The no-fly zone remained in effect until George W. Bush ordered the invasion of Iraq in May
2003.282
“Not America’s Problem,” Reluctance in the Balkans, 1990-94
Reluctance to wade into the complex imbroglio developing in the Balkans was not merely
an American phenomenon. Major powers in Europe, as well as the United States, adopted a
piecemeal approach, and as the conflict grew and became more devastating, the West “never
stopped to alter their original reluctance...or formulate a policy.”283 Yugoslavia, and its subsequent
disintegration, came to be viewed as a European problem, with the U.S. deferring to the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) “once U.S. foreign policy placed
Yugoslavia in the same category as Eastern Europe and dropped its traditional security priority.” 284
As early as 1989, the incoming U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, and
the then-deputy secretary of state, Lawrence Eagleburger, “concluded that with the end of the Cold
War Yugoslavia’s ‘former geopolitical significance’ had vanished.” 285 However, Yugoslavia’s
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perceived import in the eyes of American policymakers had been declining long before then, since
Tito’s death in 1980.286 The first years of the George H.W. Bush administration were dominated
by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and potential instability in Moscow, with very little attention spared
to the developing crisis in Yugoslavia. The Balkans policy of the first Bush White House “reflected
the belief held in European circles that if the Yugoslavs could not resolve their own quarrels, there
was little the United States could do.”287
Flying high after the relatively uncontroversial success in the Gulf War, the Bush
administration was uninterested in getting involved in the complex situation in Yugoslavia,
viewing it as a “‘regional dispute’ and a civil war rather than a conflict of global importance.”288
While some officials in the State Department favored involvement in the emerging crisis, other
administration advisors on the National Security Council and at the Pentagon were staunchly
opposed.289 A Croatian government official remembered an interaction with National Security
Advisor Scowcroft where he was told “in September 1990 that the U.S. administration ‘supported
the unity of Yugoslavia at any cost.’” 290 Secretary Baker described U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia
as based on four principles: democratization, human rights, marketization, and “above all,
unity.”291 However, as the crisis escalated, U.S. officials were forced to shift foreign policy
accordingly.
In a June 1991 trip to the Balkans, Secretary of State James Baker warned the leaders of
the Slovenian and Croatian republics that the U.S. would not recognize or offer economic
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assistance if they declared independence from Yugoslavia.292 In remarks to the media on
November 8, 1991, President Bush applauded the European Commission for taking a leadership
role in Yugoslavia, and maintained that he had yet to make a final decision on the administration’s
official policy.293 By early April the next year, however, the situation in the Balkans had worsened
to the point of warranting more U.S. attention. On April 7, the U.S. offered official diplomatic
recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia and announced the lifting of sanctions
on the new states. 294 In an official statement, Bush expressed support for the Cyrus Vance peace
plan and deployment of UN peacekeepers and argued that the EC Peace Conference was the
“indispensable forum” for conflict resolution.295 At the July 1992 meeting of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe and in the face of calls for more action from the Bosnian
president, Secretary Baker reaffirmed the official position, stating pointedly that U.S. involvement
was limited to the provision of humanitarian aid and the enforcement of UN sanctions.296 That was
as far as the Bush administration was willing to go to intervene in the Bosnian conflict. According
to a September article that same year, after a meeting with Defense Secretary Dick Cheney,
European officials said he gave “vague, noncommittal responses” in response to pleas for more
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American involvement.297 It left them to conclude that “the Bush administration had decided to
avoid any military action in Yugoslavia” before the next election. 298
Candidate Clinton made a point of distinguishing himself from his Republican rival on the
issue of Bosnia during the 1992 presidential election. He criticized the administration for not taking
a more forceful stance, arguing that “if Serbia continued to violate the cease-fire agreement in
Bosnia, ‘the United States should take the lead in seeking U.N. Security Council authorization for
air strikes’” and that the U.S. “should be prepared to lend appropriate military support to that
operation.”299 However, after his ascendancy to commander-in-chief, Clinton softened his position
toward the violence in the Balkans. Much like his predecessor, he soon determined that the conflict
in the former Yugoslavia was not critical to U.S. national interests and continued the Bush policy
of deferring to European policies.300
The hawkish position on Bosnia during the campaign can be attributed to two of Clinton’s
foreign policy advisors, Sandy Berger and Anthony Lake. 301 During the administration, Lake
found a kindred spirit in Secretary Albright, who also favored U.S. military intervention. 302 In a
leaked memorandum, it was revealed that Albright had “asked Clinton to use air power to prevent
any further Serb advances” in March 1993.303 Unfortunately for Lake and Albright, the opponents
of military engagement won the day during the first years of Clinton’s presidency. Colin Powell,
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who retained his position as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until September, was particularly
influential with President Clinton. Powell, opposed to military involvement, frightened the
president with the prospect of a long and drawn-out conflict and the requirement of at least 500,000
American troops.304 Lacking a clear consensus among his foreign policy advisors, President
Clinton declined to make a final decision of strategy, and instead continued to follow Europe’s
lead.305
Despite the chilling reports emerging from the Balkan warzone, the Clinton White House
had little interest in weighing into another humanitarian conflict. Stung by the disastrous operation
with the UN in Somalia, the president was reluctant to commit more American troops abroad, even
refusing to intervene to stop the genocide in Rwanda. It wasn’t until the specter of more bloody
conflict leading up to the expiration of the April 1994 ceasefire that Clinton’s advisors lobbied in
earnest for a shift in the administration’s Bosnia policy. After the massacre in Srebrenica in July
1995, the pro-intervention faction in the administration won out, convincing the president to
support Lake’s “endgame strategy”306 and paving the way for the Dayton Accords.
Crossing the ‘red line’ in Syria, 2012
In March 2011, at the beginning of the Arab Spring, the demonstrations in Syria were
largely characterized as small and peaceful in nature.307 They did not remain that way. Soon the
protests spread across the country and even included Sunni Muslims, typically thought to be loyal
to President Assad.308 Government forces began a brutal crackdown on the pro-democracy
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uprising, firing on civilians, leaving many dead and even more wounded.309 By the end of April,
the White House had sanctioned three top officials in the Assad regime, but refrained from
imposing the same punitive measures on the Syrian president, drawing a sharp distinction between
this cautious approach and the more assertive stance toward Libya.310
During a speech at the State Department on May 19, 2011, President Obama criticized the
Assad government’s response to the Arab Spring protests, condemning the regime for the “murder
and mass arrests of its citizens” and praised the Syrian demonstrators as courageous. 311 He also
issued a stark warning: “President Assad now has a choice: He can lead that transition [to
democracy], or get out of the way.” 312 With the R2P doctrine underpinning the U.S.-led
intervention into Libya, it appeared as though the Obama administration was similarly poised to
confront the Assad regime in Syria.
Despite the surface-level similarities, it became quite clear that the White House was
charting a different course in dealing with the Assad regime as opposed to Qaddafi’s government
in Libya. Donilon, who opposed the U.S. intervention into Libya, also cautioned against
interference in the Syrian civil war, believing a similar military operation against the Assad regime
to be unavailable or ill-advised.313 According to the Washington Post, Obama’s national security
advisor was hesitant to paint the Arab Spring uprisings with broad strokes, telling the paper that
the U.S. “should be careful not to take actions now that it might regret down the road” in an ever-
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evolving situation.314 Before the August 21, 2013, attack in Ghouta, the president was quite
hesitant to send military forces to Syria, especially as the situation in Libya continued to
deteriorate.315 Power remembered President Obama as preoccupied with the lack of multilateral
support for the use of force and the potential of a Russian veto on the Security Council rendering
any resolution moot.316
When asked about the deteriorating situation in Syria on August 20, 2012, President Obama
told the press that “a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving
around or being utilized.”317 He maintained that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime
“would change my calculations significantly” about U.S. military involvement in Syria. 318 Despite
this statement, the Obama administration took no military action after the Assad regime began
small-scale chemical attacks on civilians beginning in 2012 and into early 2013.319
Power advocated for U.S. intervention after the first signs of the Assad regime deploying
chemical weapons against civilians were confirmed by American intelligence.320 Ben Rhodes,
Obama’s deputy national security advisor, fought alongside Power for intervention into the Syrian
civil war. He argued that “if we thought it was worth tipping the balance against Assad, we should
be debating whether to strike his regime directly.” 321 He told the president during a meeting that
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“if things kept deteriorating...we should ‘consider bombing Assad’s runways’ or...consider
‘limited strikes against some regime infrastructure.’” 322
Nearly a year after the issuance of the “red line,” on August 30, 2013, the White House
released a statement, declaring that the government “assessed with high confidence that the Syrian
government carried out a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs” days before on
August 21.323 After Assad’s sarin gas attack, positions on possible U.S. military intervention within
the administration hardened. According to Power, “officials who had previously argued against
using military force in Syria were now in full agreement” with the president’s new forceful
position.324 President Obama had decided that the cost of inaction in the face of the heinous
chemical weapons attack was far greater than the potential consequences of military
involvement.325
In the days following the chemical assault, Obama met with his advisors and devised plans
for limited military strikes against Assad’s forces. 326 However, the presence of UN investigators
in Syria posed a problem. Gathering evidence from previous alleged chemical weapons attacks,
the UN team was still in-country, investigating the recent attack in Ghouta. 327 With the UN
Secretary-General refusing to pull the inspectors out, President Obama’s planned strikes would
have to wait.328 Unfortunately for the proponents of action, the delay proved to be fatal to the
president’s resolve.
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On March 30, less than a week after the attack, Obama relayed to his national security team
that he was uncomfortable pursuing military intervention without prior congressional
authorization.329 Recalling a conversation she had had with Obama’s chief of staff, Susan Rice
was shocked that the president had reneged on his decision to order missile strikes against the
Assad regime, instead deciding to ask for a resolution in Congress. 330 According to Rice, following
the regime’s use of sarin gas on civilians, “almost all the NSC principals believed we needed to
act militarily” against Syria. 331 Rice claimed that at a late August meeting, “the president had
approved military targets” and that “we were very close to launching.”332 However, the apparent
consensus had shifted. In a meeting with other senior administration advisers, Rice wrote that she
was “the lone dissenter” who “argued for proceeding with military action, as planned.” 333 The bill
to authorize U.S. military force in response to the chemical weapons attacks never made it to a
floor vote in either chamber, and the plan for limited strikes was scrapped.334
While the interventionists had carried the day in Libya, the pragmatists were able to change
the president’s mind in Syria. The catastrophe that followed the U.S. intervention into Libya had
an enormous effect on the Obama administration’s Syrian policy. The failure in Libya was still at
the forefront of the president’s mind, affecting how he and key officials viewed the viability of
American military involvement in a seemingly more complex situation in Syria. 335
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In October 2013, after international negotiations between the U.S. and Russia, the Assad
regime relented and agreed to turn over its stockpile of chemical weapons to the UN for destruction
under the auspices of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. 336 As the
weapons were destroyed, the Obama administration’s strategy toward Syria significantly cooled
until mid-2014.337 The arrival of ISIS on the international stage significantly complicated the
situation on the ground. The White House eventually agreed to send military advisors to train
forces and aid Kurdish rebels in the fight against the Islamic State. 338 President Obama, three-anda-half years into the Syrian civil war, eventually ordered air strikes against ISIS forces, but “kept
regular ‘boots on the ground’ out of the fight.” 339 He would pass down this chaotic conflict to his
successor when he left office in 2017.
Limitations and Alternative Explanations
My research is limited by the availability of archival information. While I was able to
access a great number of records, especially from the earlier presidencies, many of the necessary
records are still classified or otherwise restricted under the Presidential Records Act and Freedom
of Information Act. Moreover, some records are not open to the public, and must be accessed onsite, which I was unable to do due to public health restrictions. When possible, I relied upon
secondhand accounts of pertinent records, either through administration memoirs or other
journalistic and scholarly works.
My investigation is further limited by the other evidentiary sources chosen. For example,
when archival material was unavailable, I relied upon the memoirs of key administration officials.
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While these works are often rich in detail, bias and potential revisionism are inherent risks in
relying upon them for evidence. Interviews and public statements have a similar issue, as officials
may not be completely honest in their opinions and preferences when on the record.
Alternative explanations of intervention behavior in the literature include democratization
efforts, the protection of human rights, and security issues. 340 Some scholars argue that the U.S.
has intervened in other states in an effort to promote democracy. 341 While this rationale may be
supported by official rhetoric, in practice, this does not adequately explain American intervention
after the Cold War. Democracy promotion was not an objective in the Persian Gulf War, nor was
it necessarily the main justification in Bosnia or Libya. Other researchers have argued that
American intervention behavior is underpinned by the desire to protect and promote human rights
around the world.342 While this framework can potentially explain American involvement,
especially in Bosnia and Libya, it does not explain why the U.S. decides not to intervene in similar
situations, such as the refusal to stop chemical weapons attacks in Syria. Realist frameworks are
also used to explain the intervention practices of the United States. These arguments revolve
around the idea that the U.S. is more likely to interfere to protect its vital security interests,
including combatting terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 343 While it
may potentially explain U.S. involvement in Iraq and Libya, it does little to explicate involvement
in Bosnia, nor does it explain why the U.S. did not intervene in Syria, a state that posed a greater
security threat than Libya.
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I argue that the end of the Cold War presented U.S. elite advisors with a unique opportunity
in the foreign policy arena, allowing them to pursue personal policy preferences rather than focus
on the singular threat of a hostile superpower. I believe these preferences are the best explanatory
factors of the decision to intervene.
Conclusion
The end of the Cold War and eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union shocked the world,
changing the composition of the international system and fundamentally shifting the focus of
American foreign policy. The collapse of its foremost rival in world politics drastically expanded
the options facing U.S. policymakers, allowing them to pursue personal preferences without the
constraints of anti-Soviet or anticommunist doctrines. Through an examination of the first four
presidencies in the post-Cold War era, I argue that the decision to intervene in another state is
based upon these policy preferences. From national security advisors to secretaries of state and
defense, elites within the executive branch have enormous influence over the president, and thus
over U.S. intervention strategy.
A potential further avenue of research would be an exploration of intervention strategy
before and after the September 11 attacks. As a pivotal moment in U.S. history, a valuable inquiry
could be made into how the practice of intervention has changed and been justified by
policymakers in the aftermath. Another similar investigation could be made into the intervention
policies of other states to understand how other governments make the decision to intervene.
Similarly, future researchers may explore the difference in intervention strategy between
authoritarian and non-authoritarian regimes.
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